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I. INTRODUCTION
There may be fifty ways to leave your lover,' but there are only three
predominant ways of determining the amount in controversy in a petition to
vacate an arbitration award. Whether your musical tastes run to Guns N'
Roses or Paul Simon, however, those three principal methods are two too
many. They represent a split among the circuits, dividing courts, and
sometimes even circuit panels themselves, on an important federal
jurisdictional issue.
Take, for example, this recent case-in-point. On January 30, 2004, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.2
that the amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction purposes in a
petition to vacate an arbitration award is the amount of the arbitrator's award
rather than the amount sought in the underlying arbitration.3 The opinion
was one of a divided panel.4 The Honorable Alex Kozinski dissented and
argued that the court should have looked to the amount the plaintiff was
demanding in the underlying arbitration. 5 On May 25, 2004, the Ninth
Circuit withdrew the Luong opinion6 and issued another opinion in its place.7
This time, the now-unanimous panel found federal question jurisdiction
1. PAUL SIMON, 50 Ways to Leave Your Lover, on STILL CRAZY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS
(Warner Bros. 1975).
2. Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 356 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn, 368 F.3d 1113
(9th Cir. 2004).
3. Id. at 1194 ("Therefore, we conclude that the better rule is that the matter in controversy on a
petition to vacate an arbitration award should be measured by the amount of the award.").
4. Id. at 1188.
5. Id. at 1197 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("In Luong's case, however, the amount in dispute
between the parties is more than $178,000-the amount to which Luong claims to be entitled. If
Luong persuades the district court to vacate the arbitration award, Luong will continue to press his
claim for an award in that amount.").
6. Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 368 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2004).
7. Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 368 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2004).
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where it had not before, and ducked the amount in controversy debate
altogether.8
The Luong opinion was not the beginning of the debate over the proper
method for determining the amount in controversy in a petition to vacate an
arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act. Neither was the
opinion's withdrawal the end of the matter. In response to this "troubling
issue," 9 courts have adopted three different approaches for determining the
amount in controversy. Some courts look to the amount of the arbitrator's
award as the amount in controversy.1 ° Other courts look to the amount of
the original demand in arbitration so long as the party seeking vacatur
requests that the district court remand the matter to arbitration. 1 One court
looks to the amount of the underlying arbitration demand irrespective of
whether remand is requested.
12
The purpose of this article is to analyze the different approaches of the
courts to this issue, and to consider which of these approaches best comports
with the policies underlying federal diversity jurisdiction and arbitration.
Part II discusses general background principles. It begins with a summary of
the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act and the nature of vacatur
proceedings as authorized by the Act. Part II also includes a discussion of
general jurisdictional principles, and the breadth of federal jurisdiction in
vacatur actions.
Part III analyzes existing federal case law regarding the amount in
controversy in a petition to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Part III includes an explanation of the three predominant
methods of determining the amount in controversy, which we will call the
arbitration demand, arbitration award, and remand approaches. The part also
explores the potential overlap in the application of the approaches.
Part IV examines the three approaches in light of longstanding
jurisdictional principles. Recognizing that the vacatur action could not exist
independent of the underlying arbitration, but is a natural extension of the
8. Id. at 1112 ("We agree and therefore conclude that we have federal question jurisdiction over
the case."); compare Luong, 356 F.3d at 1196 ("Nor does he establish a basis for federal question
jurisdiction.").
9. Goodman v. CIBC Oppenheimer & Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
10. See, e.g., id. at 1184 ("[T]he amount in controversy is equal to the arbitration award
regardless of the amount sought in the underlying arbitration."); see also Baltin v. Alaron Trading
Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1472 (11 th Cir. 1997) (looking to the amount of the arbitrator's award as the
amount in controversy); Ford v. Hamilton Invs., Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 1994) (same).
11. See, e.g., Sirotsky v. NYSE, 347 F.3d 985, 989 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he amount in
controversy in a suit challenging an arbitration award includes the matter at stake in the arbitration,
provided the plaintiff is seeking to reopen the arbitration.").
12. See, e.g., Am. Guar. Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1934) ("[lI]t is the amount in
controversy which determines jurisdiction, not the amount of the award."). As discussed infra,
despite the cited language of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, other courts have suggested that the Ninth
Circuit did not establish that the amount at issue in the underlying arbitration defines the amount in
controversy in a petition to vacate. See, e.g., Goodman, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-85.
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ongoing chain of events flowing therefrom, the author posits that the
approach most consistent with long lines of jurisdictional jurisprudence is to
look to the original demand in arbitration. The author takes the novel
approach that filing the petition to vacate is in essence an appeal of the
arbitration award. Viewing the vacatur action as the appeal it is, this part
concludes that, according to traditional litigation principles, the amount in
controversy must be determined with reference to the original action (the
arbitration demand), not the appeal (the vacatur petition).
Part V outlines the different approaches to determining the amount in
controversy in light of policies underlying arbitration. The author posits that
looking solely to the amount of the arbitration award fails to strike an
appropriate balance between fairness and efficiency policy goals, but that the
arbitration demand approach protects those principles.
But first, the general principles will be discussed.
II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND THE PETITION TO VACATE AN
ARBITRATION AWARD
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
For decades, litigants, courts, and commentators have recognized
arbitration as an efficient and cost-effective alternative to traditional
litigation.'3 Litigants have been willing to forego the "niceties" of a court,'4
and instead accept restricted discovery, 5 scant arbitral findings,' 6 and
13. See, e.g., Roger Alford, Report to Law Revision Commission Regarding Recommendations
for Changes to California Arbitration, 4 PEPP. DISP. REs. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2003). Alford asserts that:
Arbitration is generally a faster means of resolving disputes than litigation. Parties may
bypass crowded court dockets, and instead may schedule an arbitration hearing at their
own time and convenience. Additionally, the informality associated with an arbitration
proceeding-minimal pleading, discovery, motion practice, and other pre-trial
procedures-can dramatically reduce the time to settlement or review the merits by an
impartial tribunal. The limited opportunity for appeal or court review has the same effect
of favoring arbitration. Furthermore, parties may choose to appoint arbitrators with
professional knowledge of the matter being disputed, thus sparing the time and expense
associated with educating a judge or jury. A reduced trial time may translate into cost
savings as well.
Id.; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) (noting the Federal
Arbitration Act's liberal policy favoring arbitration is to promote the efficient resolution of claims).
14. See, e.g., Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr.
Implement Workers of Am. (UAW), 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974) ("In handling evidence an
arbitrator need not follow all the niceties observed by the federal courts.").
15. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (noting that
arbitration agreements are not invalid simply because discovery under the agreement "might not be
as extensive as in federal courts .... ").
16. See, e.g., Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1990) The court
noted that:
It has long been settled that arbitrators are not required to disclose or explain the reasons
underlying an award .... The policy behind such a rule is manifest. If arbitrators were
required to issue an opinion or otherwise detail the reasons underlying an arbitration
award, the very purpose of arbitration-the provision of a relatively quick, efficient and
informal means of private dispute settlement-would be markedly undermined.
230
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limited rights of appeal 17 in order to expedite 8 and privatize' 9 their disputes.
Although support for arbitration has not been universal,20 and even courts
have recognized that arbitration is not a perfect path to justice,21 contractual
arbitration provisions are now standard, and arbitration proceedings
customary.
22
In 1925, the United States Congress gave a vote of confidence in the
non-judicial forum of arbitration when it enacted the Federal Arbitration
Id. (citing United Steel Workers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960)).
17. See, e.g., id.; Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 260
(2d Cir. 2003) ("The scope of the district court's review of an arbitral award is limited.").
18. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985). The court held that:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.
Id.; see also Sink v. Aden Enter., 352 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) ("One purpose of the [Federal
Arbitration Act's] liberal approach to arbitration is the efficient and expeditious resolution of
claims.").
19. See, e.g., Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Center v. Union de Tronquistas
Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Arbitration is, however, a private proceeding which is
generally closed to the public.").
20. Pre-dispute arbitration agreements typically draw the most heat. See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 643 (1996) Stemlight asserts that:
[Wihile binding arbitration may well be preferable from the standpoint of certain
segments of society-particularly large companies that draft the terms and court
administrators and judges who can reduce their own workload-there is no reason to
believe that society as a whole is better off with binding arbitration. Rather, the Court's
espousal of largely unregulated and unregulable mandatory binding arbitration appears
likely to harm the poorest and least educated members of society.
Id.; see also Paul D. Carrington, The Dark Side of Contract Law, 36 TRIAL 73, 76 (2000) (noting that
there is nothing "inherently unjust or unreasonable about arbitration," but warning that "an
arbitration clause may be merely a disguised provision" that unfairly burdens and prejudices "the
weaker party who asserts a future claim... ").
21. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Arbitration is not a
perfect system of justice, nor it is designed to be."); cf Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496,
502 (4th Cir. 2002) ("It is certainly possible that 'the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant ... from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral
forum."').
22. See Michael J. Brady, The Arbitration Train That Cannot Be Stopped, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNSEL, June 2003, at 52. Brady asserts that:
In the last decade, there has been a nationwide move by businesses, health-care entities,
and consumers towards contractual arbitration .... Arbitration agreements are now
common in employment contracts, installment sales contracts for goods and services,
credit card relationships, securities/stock transactions, and health care admission
documents, to name just a few.
Id.; Winston Wood, Employment Arbitration Agreements Face Further Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Dec.
12, 2000, at A l (noting that "[a]rbitration agreements are popular with many companies wanting to
avoid the high cost of litigating employee disputes"); cf Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 491
(7th Cir. 2004) ("Standard-form agreements are a fact of life, and given [section] 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, arbitration provisions in these contracts must be enforced unless states
would refuse to enforce all off-the-shelf package deals.").
Act.23 The Act has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as
a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements., 24  Reenacted in
1947,25 the Act's purpose was to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements" in English common law and American courts.26
Today the Federal Arbitration Act 27 applies to written agreements to
arbitrate "in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce...., 28  The Act does not require arbitration of
maritime or commerce contract disputes.29 It does provide, however, that
the privately-negotiated arbitration provisions in those contracts will be
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."30 The Act even provides an
enforcement mechanism. It authorizes courts to order parties to arbitrate in
keeping with the terms of their arbitration agreement upon petition of an
aggrieved party.31  The Act further authorizes courts to stay litigation
proceedings pending the arbitration.32
B. The Petition to Vacate
The Federal Arbitration Act also provides a mechanism for arbitral
parties to petition the "United States court" to vacate an arbitration award.33
The Act provides that the court may vacate an award:
23. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307
(2000)); see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (recognizing
codification).
24. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (citations omitted).
25. The Act is codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000) (codified and enacted by Act of July 30,
1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669).
26. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.; see also Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 867
F.2d 809, 813 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The Act is a statement of Congressional intent in upholding private
parties' arrangements for dispute resolution. Thus, the policies of the Act should be effectuated
whenever possible, and federal courts should 'rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."') (quoting
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
27. For a more detailed history of arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act, see Kenneth F.
Dunham, Binding Arbitration and Specific Performance Under the F.A.A.: Will This Marriage of
Convenience Survive?, 3 J. OF AM. ARB. (forthcoming 2004).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). "The requirement that the underlying transaction involve commerce is
to be broadly construed so as to be coextensive with congressional power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause." Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986).
29. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474-
75 (1989) ("[T]he FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at any time; it
confers only the right to obtain an order directing that 'arbitration proceed in the manner provided
for in [the parties '] agreement. "') (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000)).
30. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (quoting
same).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Section 4 dictates when courts may hear the application for order compelling
arbitration, and also the procedures for the application and hearing. Id.
32. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002). The Act also provides that the United States court may confirm,
modify, or correct the arbitration award upon proper petition of the parties. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 11
(2000).
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(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.34
Federal courts have also recognized various non-statutory grounds for
vacatur, such as where the arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the law or
when the arbitration award is "completely irrational., 35 The availability of
non-statutory grounds varies by circuit.36 Courts are also split over whether
parties can contract for a more expansive judicial review of arbitration
awards than the recognized statutory and non-statutory grounds.37
34. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
35. See, e.g., Coutee v. Barington Capital Group, 336 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We may
vacate an arbitration award 'only if that award is completely irrational, exhibits a manifest disregard
of the law, or otherwise falls within one of the grounds set forth in [the FAA]."') (citations omitted);
Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing "two 'extremely narrow'
judicially created standards for vacating an arbitration award": when the award is "completely
irrational" or "'evidence[s] a manifest disregard for the law'); Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307
F.3d 1277, 1289 n.9 (1 th Cir. 2002) ("In addition, if no rationale was given by the arbitration panel
for the award and the reviewing court can determine no rational basis for it, the award may be
vacated on two non-statutory bases: (1) the award is arbitrary and capricious; or (2) enforcement of
the award is contrary to public policy."); see also Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d
752, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1999). The court noted that:
Most state and federal courts recognized one or more nonstatutory grounds warranting
vacatur of an arbitral award, including: (1) the arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law;
(2) the award's conflict with a strong public policy; (3) the award being arbitrary and
capricious; (4) the award being completely irrational; or (5) the award's failure to draw
its essence from the underlying contract.
Id.
36. For an in-depth discussion and critique of various non-statutory bases for vacatur, see
Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration
Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 763-800 (1996).
37. Those courts disallowing an expanded standard of review include the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, among others. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987,
1000 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A] federal court may only review an arbitral decision on the grounds set
forth in the Federal Arbitration Act. Private parties have no power to alter or expand those grounds,
233
The fact that the Federal Arbitration Act provides a mechanism for
vacating arbitration awards does not automatically mean that federal courts
have jurisdiction to hear the petition to vacate. Although state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such matters,38 the great irony of the
Act is that it "create[s] a body of federal substantive law,"3 9 but does not
itself confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear vacatur petitions.40 As
with more traditional litigation, federal courts can only hear the petition to
vacate if independent jurisdiction exists,4' namely, federal question
jurisdiction, 2 diversity jurisdiction, 3 or specific statutory authority. 4
and any contractual provision purporting to do so is, accordingly, legally unenforceable."); Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2001) ("We agree and hold that parties may not
contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards."). Other courts, including the Third and
Fifth Circuits, allow parties to contract for expanded review. See Action Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004) ("'Just as parties may limit by contract the issues which
they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be
conducted.' ... Accordingly, this Court has consistently held that parties may modify the FAA's
standard of arbitration review.") (citations omitted); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d
287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) ("We now join with the great weight of authority and hold that parties may
opt out of the FAA's off-the-rack vacatur standards and fashion their own (including by referencing
state law standards)."). See also Schoch, 341 F.3d at 788-89 & n.3 (recognizing the split in the
circuits on the issue, and, without reaching the issue, "express[ing] skepticism" as to whether
contracting for expanded judicial review is permissible). Courts allowing expanded review cite the
parties' right to contract for the scope of their arbitration. See Action Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d at 340-
41. Other courts, however, reason that allowing expanded review would undermine the judiciary's
respect for the arbitral process, and constitute unfair intervention in the judicial process. See Bowen,
254 F.3d at 933-34.
38. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.9 (1984) ("While the Federal
Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements,
it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or
otherwise."); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)
("The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates
a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to
arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 28
1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V) or otherwise."); Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Comm., Int'l
Union, Local 261, 912 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[S]ection 10 of the [Federal] Arbitration Act
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on a district court.").
41. See, e.g., Garrett v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir.
1993) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32, in noting that "[t]he Supreme Court
has consistently held that federal courts may hear claims under the Act only when there is an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction"); Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc., 912 F.2d at 611 ("There
must be an independent basis of jurisdiction before a district court may entertain petitions under the
Act.").
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2004) (providing the statutory basis for federal question jurisdiction).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2004) (providing the statutory basis for diversity jurisdiction).
44. See, e.g., Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that
in the context of a petition to vacate an arbitration award, the rule is "[imn a given case, a federal
district court must have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction
under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3)
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)").
234
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C. Diversity Jurisdiction and the Amount in Controversy
A district court has federal question jurisdiction when the action
"aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 45 No
amount in controversy is necessary.46
Diversity jurisdiction is different. Diversity jurisdiction is not based on
the existence of a federal question,47 but is intended to allow an impartial
forum for out-of-state litigants who may otherwise suffer from local bias in
state courts.48 While many argue that this concern is now antiquated,49 the
same requirements must still exist for diversity jurisdiction to be present: the
amount in controversy must exceed $75,000,50 and the civil action must be
between parties of diverse citizenship.1
Whether a party has satisfied the amount in controversy requirement in a
civil action brought in federal court is determined at the time the action is
filed.52 "This time-of-filing rule is hornbook law .... For nearly seventy
years, courts have held that, in determining whether the amount in
controversy requirement has been met, the sum demanded in good faith by
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
46. See id. An amount-in-controversy requirement formerly existed but was eliminated in 1980.
See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369
(1980).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
48. See O'Brien v. AVCO Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1033 (2d Cir. 1969) (citing Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.)).
49. See, e.g., John Conyers, Jr., Class Action "Fairness" - A Bad Deal for the States and
Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493, 499 (2003) ("[T]he assumption that out-of-state defendants
will be victims of prejudice in state courts-the principle underlying diversity jurisdiction-may
have been valid once, but it is no longer.").
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The $75,000 threshold is "exclusive of interest and costs." Id. "The
first congressional grant to district courts to take suits between citizens of different States fixed the
requirement for the jurisdictional amount in controversy at $500." Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,
334 (1969) (citing the Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (1789)). Congress raised the minimum
amount in controversy to $2,000 in 1887 (Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 (1887)); to
$3,000 in 1911 (Act of Mar. 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091, 1091 (1911)); to $10,000 in 1958 (Act of July
25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (1958)); to $50,000 in 1988 (Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988));
and finally to $75,000 in 1996 (Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, §
205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996)).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The statute specifically provides that the civil action must be between:
(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
Id. According to the complete diversity rule, "each defendant must be diverse from each plaintiff."
Riley v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
52. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 124 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (2004).
53. Id.; see also FLEMING JAMES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.25 (5th ed. 2001) ("The
amount in controversy in diversity cases is determined by reference to the claim stated and the
demand for relief.").
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the plaintiff controls.54 Parties seeking to overcome this general rule must
prove to a "legal certainty" that the asserted claim is really for less than the
required jurisdictional amount.55  Once jurisdiction is established,
subsequent events in the litigation that alter the amount in controversy will
not divest the court of jurisdiction.56 Even on appeal, the time-of-filing rule
mandates that "challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction premised upon
diversity of citizenship" are measured "against the state of facts that existed
at the time of filing ....
While the amount in controversy requirement is often fairly
straightforward to apply in a traditional litigation setting, it presents a new
and interesting challenge in the context of a petition to vacate an arbitration
award.
III. DETERMINING THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY IN A PETITION TO
VACATE AN ARBITRATION AWARD - THE "TROUBLING ISSUE"
Determining the amount in controversy in a petition to vacate an
arbitration award has proven to be no simple matter. Over the past seventy
or more years, courts have struggled with this issue. Arbitration proceedings
and petitions to vacate present unique statutory and common law procedures
that do not fit neatly into any traditional litigation framework.58 The matter
is complicated by the tension between the continuing judicialization of
54. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938); see also Horton v.
Lib. Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) ("The general federal rule has long been to decide what
the amount in controversy is from the complaint itself, unless it appears or is in some way shown
that the amount stated in the complaint is not claimed 'in good faith."'); Erwin v. Allied Van Lines,
Inc., 239 F. Supp. 144, 145 (W.D. Ark. 1965) ("The prayer of the complaint or the amount
demanded by plaintiff determines the amount in controversy ... .
55. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 289.
56. Id. at 289-90 ("Events occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the
amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction."). In a related removal
context, a small number of courts have held that amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 supersede St. Paul
Mercury to the extent St. Paul Mercury holds that a plaintiff's actions post-removal cannot divest the
federal court of diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bailey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1415,
1416 (N.D. Ala. 1997); see also Goodman v. CIBC Oppenheimer & Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1180,
1184-85 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (suggesting the same in dicta). The relevant amendment provides that
"[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the case may require payment of just
costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2004). Other courts have held, however, that the proposition in St. Paul Mercury
is still good law, and not superseded by amendments to Section 1447. See, e.g., Rogers v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2000). Courts are also split on whether binding post-
removal plaintiff stipulations to reduce the amount in controversy may divest the federal court of
jurisdiction, irrespective of the Section 1447 amendments. Compare Moss v. Voyager Ins. Cos., 43
F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302-04 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (mem. and order) (holding remand proper based on
plaintiffs post-removal stipulation) with Matter of Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992)
(per curiam) ("Litigants who want to prevent removal must file a binding stipulation or affidavit
with their complaints; once a defendant has removed the case, St. Paul makes later filings
irrelevant.").
57. Grupo Dataflux, 124 S. Ct. at 1924.
58. The Federal Arbitration Act's procedures for petitions to compel, confirm, modify, or vacate
arbitration awards are prime examples. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9-11.
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arbitration,59 and the expectation that arbitration remain a non-judicial forum
existing separate from the courts. 60  Fuel this fire with a statutory
framework, the Federal Arbitration Act, that has been recognized as
constituting substantive federal law, 61 but that does not confer independent
jurisdiction on federal courts. 62 Then add one more part kerosene by
creating with that statute a virtually unprecedented form of review that
allows a federal district court to review - and in its discretion even remand
with orders for a rehearing of - a "non-judicial" arbitrator's award.63 The
result has been a disjointed and fragmented amalgam of cases.
As one court mildly put it, courts are "not uniform" in their method for
determining the amount in controversy in a petition to vacate an arbitration
award. 64 Instead, federal courts have adopted three primary approaches to
determining the amount in controversy. The first two tests focus on a static
moment in time. One focuses on the time the demand or request for relief is
made in arbitration, while the other focuses on the amount of the arbitrator's
award at issue in the vacatur proceeding. The third approach, the "remand"
approach, blends the first two approaches.
59. See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford & Carroll E. Neesemann, A Response to RUAA Critics:
Codifying Modem Arbitration Law, Without Preemption, 8 No. 4 DisP. RES. MAG. 15, 17 (Summer
2002) ("Modem arbitration has, to a degree, become judicialized, that is, it has come somewhat to
resemble litigation in court."); Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract
Model ofArbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 39 (1999). Brunet asserts that:
"Folklore arbitration," characterized by final and speedy fact-based awards entered by
expert arbitrators after little prehearing process, has been the principal arbitration model.
Several recent developments, however, have combined to undermine the folklore model
and to replace it with a more innovative and flexible "contract model of arbitration." The
contract model is rooted in market-based demand from sophisticated users of the
arbitration option and is supplied by major arbitration providers who now make possible
arbitrations containing judicialized features such as discovery, preheating conferences,
and written opinions based on legal principles.
Id.
60. See, e.g., Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that
expanding judicial review of arbitration awards "would inevitably judicialize the arbitration process,
thus defeating the objective of providing an alternative to judicial dispute resolution").
61. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.9 (1984) ("While the Federal
Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements,
it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or
otherwise."); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983). The
court in Moses H. Cone Mem 'l Hosp. held that:
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction.
It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor
an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) or otherwise.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32; Harry Hoffman Printing, Inc. v. Graphic Comm.,
Int'l Union, Local 261, 912 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Section 10 of the [Federal] Arbitration
Act does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on a district court.").
63. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (defining district courts' discretion to order a rehearing).
64. Choice Hotels, Int'l, Inc. v. Felizardo, 278 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593 (D. Md. 2003).
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A. The Arbitration Award Approach
The first and most common approach to determining the amount in
controversy in a petition to vacate an arbitration award is to look at the
amount of the arbitrator's award (the "arbitration award" approach). The
Central District of California in Goodman v. CIBC Oppenheimer & Co.65
gave what is arguably the clearest definition of the arbitration award
approach.66 In Goodman, plaintiff Michael Goodman petitioned the court to
vacate an arbitration award after the arbitration panel awarded him only
$74,030.75 of the $3 million he demanded.67 Goodman claimed that the
arbitrators "manifestly disregarded the law. 68
The Central District held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
merits of Goodman's petition. 69 In examining diversity jurisdiction, the
court considered the "troubling issue" 70 of what constitutes the amount in
controversy, the $3 million arbitration demand, or the $74,030.75 arbitration
award.7 The court held that the appropriate measure was the arbitration
award.72 The court looked to the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, and relied on
the classic definition of the arbitration award approach: "the amount in
controversy is equal to the arbitration award regardless of the amount sought
in the underlying arbitration. 73 Since the amount of the award did not meet
the statutory minimum amount in controversy, the court dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.74
As the Central District of California recognized, both the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits have looked to the amount of the arbitral award to
determine the amount in controversy.75 In Ford v. Hamilton Investments,
Inc., 6 the Sixth Circuit heard an appeal of a district court order denying
Ford's motion to vacate an arbitration award, and granting Hamilton
Investments' motion to confirm the award.77 The amount of the award was
$26,666.63, plus $3,857.53 in interest.78  Ford had originally alleged
counterclaims for more than $50,000, but was awarded nothing on those
claims.7 9
65. 131 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
66. See id.
67. Id. at 1181-82.
68. Id. at 1182.
69. Id. at 1182, 1185.
70. Id. at 1184.
71. Id. at 1182, 1184.
72. Id. at 1184.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1184-85.
75. See Ford v. Hamilton Invs., Inc., 29 F.3d 255 (6th Cir. 1994); Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp.,
128 F.3d 1466 (11 th Cir. 1997).
76. Ford, 29 F.3d at 255.
77. Id. at 257.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 257, 260.
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The Sixth Circuit held that the district court was without jurisdiction to
hear the petitions to vacate and confirm.8° Looking only to the amount of
the award, and not the amount originally sought by Ford in the arbitration,
the court reasoned that "[a] claim for vacation of an arbitral award in the
amount of $50,000 or less is not sufficient for diversity jurisdiction."'8' The
Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to vacate its
confirmation order and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.82
Less than three years later, the Eleventh Circuit tackled a similar issue in
Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp.83 In Baltin, Alaron Trading Corporation
sued the Baltins in Illinois state court after the Baltins would not accept a
trade in their brokerage account.84 The refusal to accept the trade was
allegedly in violation of the Baltins' brokerage agreement with Alaron's
predecessor.85 Alaron sought actual damages of $19,921.36, punitive
damages in the amount of $50,000, attorney's fees, and costs and interest.86
The Baltins successfully compelled arbitration of the dispute in Florida, and
stayed the state court action.87 Ultimately the arbitration tribunal awarded
Alaron $36,284.36.88 The Baltins moved the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida to vacate, or alternatively to correct or
modify, the arbitration award. 89 On Alaron's motion, the district court
dismissed the action to vacate based on a forum selection clause in the
arbitration agreement. 90
Affirming the dismissal on other grounds, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition to vacate. 91 As
with the Sixth Circuit in Ford, the court looked only to the amount of the
arbitrator's award that the Baltins sought to vacate.92 The Court concluded
that this amount did not meet the then-$50,000 amount in controversy
required for diversity jurisdiction.93
80. Id. at 260.
81. Id. At the time of the Ford opinion, the amount in controversy requirement was $50,000.
See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988).
82. Ford, 29 F.3d at 260.
83. 128 F.3d 1466 (11 th Cir. 1997).
84. Id. at 1467.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1468.
87. Id. at 1467-68.
88. Id. at 1468.
89. Id. at 1467, 1468 n.2.
90. Id. at 1468.
91. Id. at 1467.
92. Id. at 1472.
93. Id.
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In addition to the courts already mentioned above, the Northern District
of Illinois,94 the Northern District of Texas,95 and the Middle District of
Alabama 96 have all looked to the amount of the arbitrator's award to
determine the amount in controversy in an action to vacate (or its corollary,
to confirm) an arbitration award.
B. The Arbitration Demand Approach
Not all courts have adopted the arbitration award approach. One of the
first courts to confront the issue of determining the amount in controversy in
a petition to vacate an arbitration award was the Ninth Circuit in American
Guaranty Co. v. Caldwell.97 In American Guaranty, the Ninth Circuit heard
an appeal of a district court order vacating an arbitration award.98 The
appeal followed a tortured history of removal, multiple arbitration awards,
and vacaturs.99
Addressing the issue of the district court's jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit
held that jurisdiction existed to hear the vacatur petition because "[i]n
addition to the record showing this original award of $32,500, it further
discloses that evidence had been offered showing appellee had suffered
damages in excess of $100,000, and in one of its answers appellant claims an
indebtedness by way of offset of $5,525. ' ° In defining an issue that courts
would debate for the next seventy years, the court further held that, "[i]t is
the amount in controversy which determines jurisdiction, not the amount of
the award."'0 1
With this statement, the Ninth Circuit delineated for the first time what
we will refer to as the "arbitration demand" approach to determining the
amount in controversy in a petition to vacate an arbitration award. This
94. Sirotsky v. NYSE, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 1052029, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2002) (mem.)
("Because Plaintiff petitioned the state court to vacate the previous arbitration award and did not
seek an order requiring the rehearing of her arbitration claim, the amount in controversy in this case
is limited to the $4,800 in forum fees assessed against her by the arbitration panel.").
95. Mannesmann Dematic Corp. v. Phillips Getschow Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. WL 282796, at *2
(N.D. Tex. March 16, 2001) (mem.) ("Under the authority of these cases, Mannesmann's motion to
confirm the arbitration award must be dismissed because the amount in controversy - the actual net
attorneys' fees award of $64,035 - is less than $75,000.").
96. Evergreen Forest Prods. of Ga., L.L.C. v. Bank of America, N.A., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1297,
1308 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (mem.) ("In the end, the Plaintiff requests that this court vacate an arbitration
award that exceeds $75,000.00, therefore the amount-in-controversy requirement is met in this
case.").
97. 72 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1934).
98. Id. at 210-12.
99. The West Summary preceding the case illustrates the case's tortured history: "From orders
vacating orders denying motions to vacate and vacating an award made on rehearing after vacation
of the original award and an order denying a motion to vacate the order vacating the second award
and grant a rehearing and new trial, the guaranty company appeals." See West Summary preceding
the American Guaranty opinion, available at http://web2.westlaw.conmfind/default.wl?RS=
WLW4. 10&VR=2.0&FN=_top&SV=Split&MT=LawSchool&RP=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&Cite=72
+F.2d+209+ (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
100. Am. Guar., 72 F.2d at 211, At the time of the American Guaranty opinion, the amount in
controversy requirement was $3,000. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 334 (1969).
101. Am. Guar.,72F.2dat2ll.
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approach centers on looking to the amount sought in the underlying
arbitration irrespective of the amount of the award.1
0 2
Admittedly, whether the Ninth Circuit intended to adopt the arbitration
demand approach wholesale is the subject of some debate. In Goodman v.
CIBC Oppenheimer & Co.,10 3 District Judge Feess distinguished the Ninth
Circuit's holding in American Guaranty to reach the conclusion that the
arbitration award approach is proper.' 4 The Goodman court implied that the
American Guaranty case does not stand for the proposition that the
arbitration demand approach is the rule of law in the Ninth Circuit.
10 5
Recognizing the language in the American Guaranty opinion that "[i]t is the
amount in controversy which determines jurisdiction, not the amount of the
award,"' 1 6 Judge Feess opined that one could only "infer" that this
"uncertain" statement means that the amount sought in the underlying
arbitration constitutes the amount in controversy, and that the true
significance of the statement is not clear. 10 7  By adopting the arbitration
award approach, Judge Feess implicitly dismissed the proposition that such
an inference would be accurate.1
0 8
The Ninth Circuit itself raised question marks about the scope of the
arbitration demand approach in the Ninth Circuit when, in early 2004, it
issued a divided opinion adopting the arbitration award approach,' °9 but then
withdrew that opinion some five months later."0 As discussed earlier, in
Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,"' Luong filed a petition to vacate an
arbitration award of zero dollars in Circuit City's favor. 112 The U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California looked to the amount of the
arbitration award in determining the amount in controversy, and on that
basis dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. 113
102. See id.; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
103. 131 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
104. Id. at 184.
105. Id.
106. Am. Guar., 72 F.2d at 211.
107. Goodman, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
108. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. In distinguishing the American Guaranty
case, and perhaps in justifying its following the arbitration award approach, the Central District also
cited the unique procedural posture of the American Guaranty case. The amount in controversy was
less than the jurisdictional minimum, but that case had already been to the district court previously
on a petition to confirm when the amount of the award was above the jurisdictional minimum, after
which the federal courts could not lose jurisdiction. See Goodman, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
109. Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 356 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn, 368 F.3d 1113
(9th Cir. 2004).
110. Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 368 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2004).
111. Luong, 356 F.3d at 1188.
112. Id. at 1190.
113. Id.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed 14 and adopted the arbitration award
approach, stating: "[T]he matter in controversy on a petition to vacate an
arbitration award should be measured by the amount of the award." '"I 5 The
court reasoned that the "vacatur proceeding must stand on its own
jurisdictional feet," and the "action in which arbitration was ordered is no
longer pending."'
1t 6
Although the court recognized the apparently inconsistent American
Guaranty opinion, it distinguished the opinion on much the same basis as
had the district court in Goodman:
In a passage upon which Luong particularly relies, we observed that
in addition to the record showing the original award of $32,500, it
also disclosed evidence that Caldwell had suffered damages greater
than $100,000 and "[i]t is the amount in controversy which
determines jurisdiction, not the amount of the award." Am. Guar.,
72 F.2d at 211. While this remark in isolation lends support to
Luong's position that the amount which counts is the amount that is
claimed, it is unlikely that we meant to hold that jurisdiction turns
on the amount in controversy rather than the amount of the award
given the posture in which the issue arose and the context in which
the remark was made. 117
Judge Kozinski dissented,"' arguing that the amount in controversy in
the vacatur action should have been determined by the amount Luong was
claiming entitlement to in the underlying arbitration." 9 In addressing the
American Guaranty ruling, Judge Kozinski opined that the language in the
opinion is the rule of law, not "idle chatter" or a "meaningless
distraction."' 2  Judge Kozinski agreed with the Luong majority that the
American Guaranty court found jurisdiction because the case had already
been to the federal district court when the award at issue met the statutory
requirement. 2 ' However, Judge Kozinski also noted that this was an
alternative ruling to the rule of law pronounced above, and that neither rule
could be ignored. 22
On May 25, 2004, this issue became moot when the Ninth Circuit
withdrew the Luong opinion,123 and issued another opinion in its place. 24
114. Id. at 1196.
115. Id. at 1194.
116. Id. at 1191.
117. Id. at 1192; see also Goodman v. CIBC Oppenheimer & Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
118. Luong, 356 F.3d at 1196-98.
119. Id. at 1197 ("In Luong's case, however, the amount in dispute between the parties is more
than $178,000-the amount to which Luong claims to be entitled. If Luong persuades the district
court to vacate the arbitration award, Luong will continue to press his claim for an award in that
amount.").
120. Id. at 1196.
121. Id. at 1196-97.
122. Id.
123. Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 368 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) (order).
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This time the now-unanimous panel found federal question jurisdiction
where it had not before, and successfully avoided the amount in controversy
debate altogether. 
125
Whether the Ninth Circuit will cling to the arbitration demand approach
or side with the arbitration award approach when the court again faces this
issue remains to be seen. The language of the American Guaranty opinion
appears unambiguous in adopting the arbitration demand approach.
26
Nevertheless, the outcome may turn on the makeup of the panel hearing the
issue when it arises again. Assuming the judges who already heard the issue
have not changed their positions, the issue currently appears to have at least
two votes in favor of the arbitration award approach.1
27
Since the Ninth Circuit recognized the arbitration demand approach in
American Guaranty, the First Circuit in Bull HN Information Systems, Inc. v.
Hutson 28 has followed the arbitration demand approach, but only in the
context of a partial arbitration award. 129 In Bull HN Information Systems,
the arbitration had been bifurcated, and only a portion of the bifurcated
proceedings were before the federal court. 130 Issues with a potential value of
more than $75,000 had yet to be arbitrated."'
In examining whether diversity jurisdiction existed, the First Circuit
held that the amount in controversy had been satisfied: "When a bifurcated
arbitration results in a partial award and enforcement proceedings under the
FAA are brought as to the partial award, we think the better rule is to
measure the amount in controversy by the amount at stake in the entire
arbitration.' 3 2  The court reasoned that holding otherwise would cause
parties to suffer a loss of federal jurisdiction for relying on bifurcation, a
procedure meant to simplify, not complicate, proceedings. 133
Although the First Circuit did not reach the issue of whether the
arbitration demand approach is appropriate outside of the partial award
context,' 4 it did recognize arguments in favor of that approach.
35
124. Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 368 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2004).
125. Id. at 1 112 ("We agree and therefore conclude that we have federal question jurisdiction over
the case."); cf Luong, 356 F.3d at 1196 ("Nor does he establish a basis for federal question
jurisdiction.").
126. Am. Guar. Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1934).
127. See Luong, 356 F.3d at 1188-96.
128. 229 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2000).
129. Id. at 324, 329.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 329.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. In explaining why it would not reach the issue, the court noted:
Hidden in the issue is another issue which we note but do not resolve. That is whether the
amount requirement is met where the sums at issue before the arbitrator at the start of the
arbitration exceed $75,000, the final (non-partial) award is for less than $75,000, and the
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Analogizing the arbitration proceedings to traditional litigation, the First
Circuit posited that looking to anything other than the original arbitration
demand could undermine arbitration policies. 3 6 For instance, it could result
in "a loss of diversity jurisdiction that would have otherwise been present if
the case had been litigated rather than arbitrated (or even if a motion to
compel arbitration had been brought)."' 13 7
C. The "Remand" Approach
The Bull HN Information Systems court did not rely exclusively on the
arbitration demand approach, however.' The court also held that it was
proper to look to the amount at issue in the underlying arbitration because
the party seeking vacatur had also requested a remand: "the remand sought
as to the commissions alone meant that Hutson might recover the sums he
sought, in excess of $75,000 ....",9
This we will refer to as the "remand approach." A sort of hybrid of the
first two approaches, the remand approach to determining the amount in
controversy looks to the underlying arbitration demand, but only when the
request to vacate includes a request for remand.14
0
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit in Sirotsky v. NYSE141 provided the
classic definition of the remand approach: "[T]he amount in controversy in a
suit challenging an arbitration award includes the matter at stake in the
arbitration, provided the plaintiff is seeking to reopen the arbitration."'
142
The Seventh Circuit also recognized the classic justification for the remand
approach: if the plaintiff were to obtain a remand, then the amount at issue in
the renewed arbitration, and thus the amount still at issue between the
parties, would be the amount sought in the original arbitration.
143
That same year, in Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Felizardo,'" the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland looked to the
amount sought in the underlying arbitration in determining that it had
diversity jurisdiction; the court relied on the fact that Choice Hotels sought a
federal judicial relief sought is merely vacating and dismissing or merely confirming the
award. (We put to one side for now the fact that the award here was only a partial award.)
Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The court also identified arguments in favor of the arbitration award approach:
There is an argument for the other view. It proceeds on the basis that arbitration is
independent of judicial proceedings, that enforcement jurisdiction is not given by the
FAA but must be established independently, and that the "legal certainty" that plaintiff's
claim is less than the jurisdictional amount is established by the arbitral award.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
141. 347 F.3d 985 (7th Cir. 2003).
142. Id. at 989.
143. Id. at 988.
144. 278 F. Supp. 2d 590 (D. Md. 2003).
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remand for rehearing when it filed its request to vacate the underlying
arbitration award.' 45 In fact, in a move the court itself described as "not
entirely free from doubt," the court combined the amount of the award the
moving party sought to avoid with the amount the moving party sought on
remand to reach the $75,000 threshold. 1
46
The Seventh Circuit and District of Maryland were not the first courts to
look to the remand approach. Twelve years earlier, the Southern District of
New York, in Hough v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 14 7 was
one of the earlier courts to apply the remand approach. 48 In Hough, the
plaintiffs petitioned the federal district court to vacate or modify an arbitral
award arising out of a securities dispute and to remand the matter to the
arbitration panel for a rehearing. 49 The defendant moved to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. 50 The defendant argued in part that the requisite amount in
controversy had not been met to satisfy diversity jurisdiction
requirements. ''
The court disagreed, and held that jurisdiction existed.'52 In concluding
that the amount in controversy had been satisfied, the court looked to "the
full amount of the original claim which was resolved by the arbitration
award." 15 3  The court followed the standard reasoning for the remand
approach: "Since an arbitration panel upon a rehearing of the case could
award plaintiffs damages for alleged violations of antitrust laws arising from
their domestic contract dispute, we cannot say 'to a legal certainty' that the
amount claimed by plaintiffs is less than the jurisdictional minimum."
54
The next year, the District of Massachusetts adopted the same remand
approach, 55 but reached a different conclusion because of the facts:
As this motion is, in part, a motion to vacate the arbitration award
and to remand for rehearing, the Court will look to the possible
award that might result from the desired rehearing .... Under
plaintiffs best case, if this court were to grant the relief requested,
and plaintiff, after rehearing before arbitration panel, obtained all
145. Id. at 592.
146. Id. at 593-94.
147. 757 F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
148. Id. at 286-87.
149. Id. at 285.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 286-87.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 287.
155. Giangrande v. Shearson Lehman/E.F. Hutton, 803 F. Supp. 464, 467-68 (D. Mass. 1992).
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that she sought, that would still amount only to $24,000, far less
than the $50,000 required by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.156
Although the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have looked to the amount of
the award in determining the amount in controversy, 57 both courts have
hinted that they just might follow the remand approach if the correct
circumstances were to present themselves. In Ford, the court stated: "In the
arbitration proceedings Mr. Ford claimed more than $50,000 [the then-
jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy] against Hamilton
Investments, but he never asked the district court to order that the arbitrators
reopen his claim against Hamilton Investments .... In Baltin, the court
was even more transparent: "The Baltins did not request an award
modification that would provide the Baltins with money. Instead, the
Baltins sought merely to reduce or eliminate the arbitration award against
them." 159 In each case, the court applied one approach, but suggested that in
different circumstances it might apply another.
D. Approach Overlap
The Ford and Baltin opinions do more than potentially foreshadow the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits' next move on this issue. The opinions
demonstrate a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence - what seems
clear in a vacuum often becomes hazy when applied. While in the abstract,
each of the three approaches may appear distinct and pure, the future
application of the three approaches by these courts may not be so cut and
dry.
The culprit for the uncertainty is in part due to the overlap between the
approaches. Because of the hybrid nature of the remand approach, it is
difficult to determine definitively from only one case what approach a court
is adopting. A court may look to the arbitration award approach in a case
when no remand is requested; in a later case, when a remand request is in the
record, that same court may look to the remand approach, as the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits have hinted they might. 160 One could view a court's doing
so as abandoning the arbitration award approach for the remand approach.
More likely, one may determine that the earlier opinion was consistent with
the remand approach, which by implication looks to the amount of the award
when remand is not requested. 6 ' The distinction is for all practical purposes
one without a difference. Still, it demonstrates the leeway courts have to
depart from a particular approach in a later case.
156. Id.
157. See Ford v. Hamilton Inv., Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 1994); Baltin v. Alaron Trading
Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1472 (11 th Cir. 1997).
158. Ford, 29 F.3d at 260.
159. Baltin, 128 F.3d at 1472 n.16.
160. See Ford, 29 F.3d at 260; Baltin, 128 F.3d at 1472.
161. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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The inherently factual nature of the amount in controversy
determination may be the other culprit for the lack of clarity. In many cases,
the courts addressing the issue of the amount in controversy in a petition to
vacate have not set out a rigid rule regarding which approach they are
following. Rather, one must glean the approach the court followed from the
factual scenario and ultimate holding. This approach leaves more flexibility
for courts in future cases and more uncertainty for litigants. Imagine this
scenario: In Case A, the court holds that the amount in controversy in that
case is equal to the amount of the arbitrator's award. In Case B, the same
court looks to the amount sought in the underlying arbitration, even though
no remand was sought in either case. In justifying the distinction, the court
explains that, in Case A, it looked to the amount of the award because it was
the same as the arbitration demand, or because both the award and demand
were below the jurisdictional minimum, so there was no reason for looking
to the demand. Unlike the scenario envisioned above, which the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits have hinted at, no court has suggested it will follow this
example. 62 But again, it demonstrates the latitude of courts on this issue.
The issue is not entirely murky, however. Some courts have fashioned
rules that seem to suggest a hard and fast rule regarding which approach that
162. In a step not too far removed from this hypothetical, Judge Kozinski in his dissent to the
now-withdrawn Luong opinion tried to harmonize the holding of the Sixth Circuit in Ford with the
Ninth Circuit's American Guaranty opinion by arguing that the amount of the award in Ford was the
same as the amount of the controversy because the total amount that could change hands was the
amount of the award. See Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 356 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), withdrawn, 368 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2004). In doing so, Judge Kozinski
actually departs from American Guaranty's implicit ruling that the amount in controversy is the
amount sought in the underlying arbitration. Judge Kozinski's dissent seems to suggest what could
be viewed as a fourth approach to determining the amount in controversy--or simply a modification
of the arbitration demand approach-looking to the amount in controversy in the underlying
arbitration unless it appears to a legal certainty at the time of the vacatur petition filing that nobody
could recover more than the jurisdictional minimum.
Judge Kozinski also tried to harmonize the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Baltin with the Ninth
Circuit's American Guaranty opinion by suggesting that the Eleventh Circuit actually adopted the
holding of American Guaranty. See Luong, 356 F.3d at 1197 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Referring to
the Baltin opinion, Judge Kozinski argued that
In a footnote, the court explained that "[tihe Baltins [against whom the arbitration award
was entered] did not request an award modification that would provide the Baltins with
money. Instead, the Baltins sought merely to reduce or eliminate the arbitration award
against them." [Baltin, 128 F.3d] at 1472 n. 16. Clearly the Eleventh Circuit looked to the
actual amount in dispute between the parties, not merely to the arbitrator's award, else
what would have been the point of footnote sixteen?
Luong, 356 F.3d at 1197 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing Baltin, 128 F.3d at
1472).
Judge Kozinski's argument is belied by other language in the Baltin opinion: "The maximum
remedy sought by the Baltins was the vacatur of the arbitration award of $36,284.69. Diversity
jurisdiction did not exist because it was a 'legal certainty' that the amount in controversy was less
than $50,000, the amount required for federal diversity jurisdiction at the time the Baltins filed suit."
Baltin, 128 F.3d at 1472. Although the point is now arguably moot given the withdrawal of the
opinion, it does demonstrate the factual nature of the amount in controversy determination.
247
court will follow, irrespective of the specific factual circumstances.1
63
Additionally, the arbitration demand approach lends itself more to a bright
line, or at least less fungible, rule. 64 Other than in the extreme example set
forth above, one court could not consistently apply the arbitration demand
approach in one case, and then apply the arbitration award approach in
another case, or vice versa. The two approaches are opposite sides of the
same coin. For the same reason, one court could not be internally consistent
by applying the arbitration demand approach in one case, and the remand
approach in the next. The underlying premise of the remand approach is
that, when remand is not sought, the court looks to the arbitration award,
which is again inconsistent with the arbitration demand approach.
65
Additionally, there would be no need to apply the remand approach in a case
after already applying the arbitration demand approach in an earlier case.
The second case either: (1) would apply an inconsistent test by looking to
the award if no remand were requested, or, (2) if remand were requested,
would imply the same inconsistent assumption by suggesting that the
arbitration demand was the proper measuring stick only because the remand
was sought.
That being said, how consistently the courts apply each of these tests has
not been tested, as no court has had the opportunity to address the issue
twice. The only exception is the Ninth Circuit, which withdrew the second
opinion.
16 6
One matter does seem clear, however. The issue does not have to create
so much uncertainty for litigants and their lawyers. As explained below,
courts could adopt the arbitration demand approach because it best protects
fundamental jurisdictional principles, and properly balances the efficiency
and fairness policies underlying arbitration. Each of these principles is
discussed in more detail below.
163. See, e.g., Goodman v. CIBC Oppenheimer & Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (C.D. Cal.
2001) ("[Tjhe amount in controversy is equal to the arbitration award regardless of the amount
sought in the underlying arbitration.").
164. One exception to the bright line nature of the arbitration demand approach is the case when
remand is sought of a partial arbitration award in bifurcated proceedings, as was the case in Bull HN
Information Systems. See Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 329 (1st Cir. 2000). In
those circumstances, the court consistently argued for the application of the remand approach
because remand had been sought, while the partial award alone allowed the court to look back to the
amount that would still be sought in the remaining arbitration proceedings irrespective of the
requested remand. See id. One could argue that the bifurcated proceedings scenario is not a true
exception because it is not a pure example of the arbitration demand approach. Whether one calls it
a pure or hybrid arbitration demand approach, however, is in practically speaking nothing more than
an issue of semantics.
165. See, e.g., Sirotzky v. NYSE, 347 F.3d 985, 989 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that "the amount
in controversy in a suit challenging an arbitration award includes the matter at stake in the
arbitration, provided the plaintiff is seeking to reopen the arbitration .. ") (emphasis added); see
also Ford v. Hamilton Invs., Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir. 1994) (looking to the arbitration award
and noting that Ford "never asked the district court to order that the arbitrators reopen his claim
against Hamilton Investments").
166. Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 356 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn, 368 F.3d 1113
(9th Cir. 2004).
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IV. PROTECTING JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES
A. The Amount in Controversy is Determined by the Plaintiff's Good Faith
Demand at the Initiation of the Action
A natural starting point for an analysis of the determination of the
amount in controversy is the initiation of the action or "controversy" itself.
To be consistent with the seventy-year-old "legal certainty" doctrine, and its
corollary "time of filing" rule, the amount in controversy should be
determined by the plaintiff's good faith demand at the initiation of the
action. 167 In a petition to vacate an arbitration award, there are only two
options for when the requisite action begins: the demand in arbitration or the
petition to vacate the award.
68
With that in mind, the elephant in the room is the fact that, for all
practical purposes, the "action" that initiates the proceedings, and thus the
action that should trigger the amount in controversy determination, is the
original demand in arbitration rather than the petition to vacate the
arbitration award. The petition to vacate is not a new and distinct
controversy, but merely a step in the chain of events beginning with the
filing of the original action in arbitration.' 69  The petition to vacate
necessarily would not and could not exist independent of the underlying
arbitration. 170 Indeed, the petition to vacate more resembles an appeal than a
new controversy.
B. The Amount in Controversy is Not Determined by the Amount on Appeal
The court hearing the petition to vacate does not serve the traditional
function of a trial court that is hearing an action for the first time, but rather
167. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); see also Horton v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) ("The general federal rule has long been to decide
what the amount in controversy is from the complaint itself, unless it appears or is in some way
shown that the amount stated in the complaint is not claimed 'in good faith.'"); Erwin v. Allied Van
Lines, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 144, 145 (W.D. Ark. 1965) ("The prayer of the complaint or the amount
demanded by plaintiff determines the amount in controversy ... ").
168. See supra Part III (discussing cases applying the arbitration demand, arbitration award, and
remand approaches, which look either to the demand in arbitration or the arbitration award to
determine the amount in controversy).
169. Cf. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 329 (lst Cir. 2000). The court
acknowledged but did not reach the merits of
analogiz[ing] this to the situation where the claim in a court complaint exceeds $75,000
but the jury awards less than $75,000. Under these circumstances, there is diversity
jurisdiction.... The analogy would be made in recognition of the close connection
between arbitration and subsequent enforcement proceedings and also to carry out the
federal policies in favor of arbitration.
Id.
170. Cf id.
249
that of an appellate court that is reviewing and passing judgment on the
decision of the arbitrator.17 1 Just as an appellate court can affirm, modify, or
vacate the judgment of a district court, 172 so can a district court confirm,
modify, or vacate the arbitrator's award. 
173
The district court hearing the petition to vacate also has the authority to
remand the matter to the original or a different arbitrator for a rehearing,
174
just as an appellate court in litigation may remand to the trial court.175 It is
extraordinary and virtually unprecedented that a federal district court has the
authority to remand a case to the private "jurisdiction" of arbitration. 176 This
is particularly true given that, in the case of the vacatur proceeding, the
district court may in its discretion direct the arbitrator to conduct a
rehearing. 77  To the extent we allow the district court to perform this
extraordinary function in a vacatur action, we should at least be admitting
that the district court is in essence acting in an appellate capacity.
178
The fact that the district court hearing the vacatur petition acts in a
manner analogous to that of an appellate court is underscored by the fact that
courts often refer to the district court's actions as a "review" of the
arbitration award. 179 At least one court has recognized that the only practical
difference between an appeal and the district court's review of an arbitrator's
award in a vacatur action is the standard of review.1 80 In Schoch v. InfoUSA,
171. See, e.g., supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text; infra note 173 and accompanying text.
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000). The statute reads:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate
judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just
under the circumstances.
Id.
173. See9U.S.C. §§9,11.
174. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000).
176. See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) ("The District
of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without authority
to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings.
Review of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court."); G.C. & K.B. Invs., Inc. v.
Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a
federal district court from "engag[ing] in direct appellate review of state court determinations that
have previously been adjudicated in any state court"). But cf Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S.
788, 796 (1986) (holding that unreviewed state administrative determination did not preclude trial de
novo on Title VII claim).
177. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b).
178. See, e.g., Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785,789 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003).
179. See, e.g., Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 260 (2d
Cir. 2003) ("The scope of the district court's review of an arbitral award is limited."); Lummus
Global Amazonas S.A. v. Aguaytia Energy del Peru, S.R. Ltda., 256 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (S.D. Tex.
2002) ("A court considering an arbitration award under the FAA applies a deferential standard of
review."); Mays v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334 (M.D. Ala. 2000) ("The
court's review of an arbitrator's decision is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ('FAA').");
Sargent v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 920, 922 (D.D.C. 1987) ("A district
court has the prerogative to exercise independent review of an arbitration award under the Federal
Arbitration Act.").
180. Schoch, 341 F.3d at 789 n.3.
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Inc., the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether parties to an
arbitration agreement could contract for expanded review of the arbitrator's
award.' 81 In "expressing grave skepticism" about whether parties could
expand the scope of review,182 the court reasoned that allowing the parties to
do so "would seemingly amend the FAA, crown arbitrators mini-district
courts, force federal trial courts to sit as appellate courts, and completely
transform the nature of arbitration and judicial review."'' 83  The Seventh
Circuit seemed to agree when in the parallel context of an appeal from an
action to set aside a labor arbitration award, the court recognized that a
district court's determination of the merits of the arbitrator's award would
"inevitably have judicialized the arbitration process .... The court
further recognized that seeking such review from the district court "would
make arbitration a three-tiered, rather than as in normal adjudication a two-
,, '81tiered, process; it would make arbitration more judicial than adjudication.
Tellingly, many courts disagree with this skepticism, and allow the
parties to contract for expanded review,' 86 thereby effectively removing the
181. Id. at788-90.
182. Id. at 789. The court ultimately did not reach the issue of whether arbitral parties could agree
to an expanded scope of review. Id. Instead, the court held that, even if the parties could do so, the
intent of the parties would have to be "clearly and unmistakably expressed." Id. The court found the
language of the agreement in that case insufficient to satisfy this standard. Id.
183. Id. at 789 n.3 (emphasis added).
184. Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 768 F.2d 180, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1985) (following
an action to set aside a labor arbitration award). The court noted:
To this we add that for judges to have taken upon themselves to determine the correctness
of the arbitrator's award would inevitably have judicialized the arbitration process, in
much the same way that judicial review, even of a deferential sort, tends to judicialize the
administrative process. The administrative agency must (at least when its proceedings
resemble adjudication) find facts like a court, and reason like a court, if it is to withstand
correction by the court. And so it would be with arbitrators if their decisions were
subject to the kind of review that courts give agencies. Yet the idea of arbitration, as of
administrative decision-making but more strongly since there is no counterpart in
arbitration to the Administrative Procedure Act, is to provide an alternative to judicial
dispute resolution, not an echo of it. If the parties to an arbitration want appellate review
of the merits of the arbitrator's decision, they can establish appellate arbitration panels,
though they rarely do. But they cannot get such review from the federal courts-which
would mean, first from the district court, and then, on appeal, from the court of appeals.
This would make arbitration a three-tiered, rather than as in normal adjudication a two-
tiered, process; it would make arbitration more judicial than adjudication.
Id.; see also Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1997). The court in Tempo
Shain Corp. cited the Ethyl Corp. decision and held that
[t]he district court was correct that arbitration panel determinations are generally
accorded great deference under the FAA. Judicial review of arbitration awards is
necessarily narrowly limited.... Undue judicial intervention would inevitably judicialize
the arbitration process, thus defeating the objective of providing an alternative to judicial
dispute resolution.
Tempo Shain Corp., 120 F.3d at 19 (citing Ethyl Corp., 768 F.2d at 183).
185. Ethyl Corp., 768 F.2d at 184.
186. See, e.g., Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 2002); Roadway
Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001).
only distinction the Seventh and Eighth Circuits could draw between an
appellate court and the district court's vacatur review. 87 Courts have even
allowed the parties to contract for the same standard of review as a
traditional appellate court. 88 For instance, in Harris v. Parker College of
Chiropractic,189 the Fifth Circuit held that the parties were entitled to
contract in their arbitration agreement for a de novo review of pure questions
of law arising out of the arbitrator's award.' 90 The de novo standard is the
same standard applied by courts of appeals reviewing a district court's
determinations of law.' 91 Indeed, de novo review is the same standard courts
of appeals apply in reviewing a district court's determinations of law when
refusing to vacate an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act. 1
92
In allowing expanded review, courts have, according to the reasoning of
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, anointed district courts as courts of appeals,
performing all of the responsibilities of an appellate court, and according to
the same standards. 193 The arbitration process has become "judicialized."' 94
Even in those circuits where the court has disallowed the expanded
standard of review, the district court is arguably performing no less of an
appellate function. While the standard of review is more restricted, at a base
level the district court is still fundamentally performing the role of an
appellate court. 195 It is not the standard of review that defines an appellate
court's function, but the fact of review itself under whatever standard.
96
The district court is still reviewing the decision and award of the arbitrator,
and potentially examining his conduct, 97 albeit under a more forgiving
standard than in traditional litigation.
98
187. See Schoch, 341 F.3d at 789 n.3.
188. See, e.g., Harris, 286 F.3d at 793 (applying de novo review to questions of law based on the
parties' arbitration agreement); Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 1997 U.S. App. WL
452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished) (same); Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); see also New England Util. v. Hydro-
Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 61-65 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding with reservations that arbitration
provision allowing the arbitrating parties to "petition a court of competent jurisdiction for review of
errors of law" was enforceable) (citations and inner quotations omitted).
189. 286 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2002).
190. Id. at 793-94.
191. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 367 F.3d 675,
678 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The district court's determinations of law are reviewed de novo and its
determinations of fact are reviewed for clear error.").
192. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 (1995) ("We believe,
however, that the majority of Circuits is right in saying that courts of appeals should apply ordinary,
not special, standards when reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards."); Jeff
D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2004) ("We review the district court's denial of a
motion to vacate the judgment for an abuse of discretion.... We review de novo, however, any
questions of law underlying the district court's decision.") (citations omitted).
193. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 59, 183-85 and accompanying text.
195. See Schoch, 341 F.3d at 789 n.3.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4) (listing statutory bases for vacatur). Three of the statutory
bases regard arbitrator misconduct, partiality, corruption, or excess of power. See id.
198. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper-Allied Indus., 309 F.3d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding that in an action to vacate or confirm an arbitration award, a court "must accord 'an
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Viewing the court hearing the vacatur action as analogous to a court
sitting in an appellate capacity, longstanding jurisprudential principles
dictate that the amount in controversy is not to be determined at the filing of
the appellate briefs.' 99 Imagine the following scenario: ABC sues DEF in
federal court for $1 million. ABC receives a verdict in its favor for $72,000,
and appeals to the federal appellate court. The federal appellate court
dismisses the appeal because the amount in controversy is only $72,000.
Such a result would be unprecedented, violating decades of
jurisprudence. °( The amount in controversy is $1 million, assuming the
complaint is filed in good faith.20' The court then maintains jurisdiction
regardless of events occurring subsequently in the litigation that reduce the
amount in controversy. 0 2 Therefore, viewing the vacatur action as a type of
appeal, the amount in controversy cannot be determined as the amount of the
arbitration award a party is seeking to vacate, just as the amount in
controversy in traditional litigation is not determined by the amount of the
judgment being appealed.
The jurisdictional shortcomings inherent in the arbitration award
approach are not solved by the remand approach to determining the amount
in controversy. The remand approach dictates that one look to the original
arbitration demand when remand is requested.20 3 In that way, the remand
approach reaches the conclusion that the arbitration demand is the proper
method of determining the amount in controversy.204 However, the remand
approach presupposes that the arbitration award approach is proper when
remand is not requested.20 5 The remand approach, therefore, suffers from
extraordinary level of deference' to the underlying award itself") (quoting Keebler Co. v. Milk
Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, Local No. 471, 80 F.3d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1996)).
199. See Horton v. Lib. Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) ("The general federal rule has
long been to decide what the amount in controversy is from the complaint itself, unless it appears or
is in some way shown that the amount stated in the complaint is not claimed 'in good faith."');
Erwin v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 144, 145 (W.D. Ark. 1965) (stating that "[tlhe prayer
of the complaint or the amount demanded by plaintiff determines the amount in controversy"); see
also Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1) (discussing requirements for filing a notice of appeal for "[a]n appeal
permitted by law as of right from a district court to a court of appeals").
200. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
201. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); see also supra
note 194.
202. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 289-90.
203. See, e.g., Sirotzky v. NYSE, 347 F.3d 985, 989 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[Tlhe amount in
controversy in a suit challenging an arbitration award includes the matter at stake in the arbitration,
provided the plaintiff is seeking to reopen the arbitration.").
204. See id.
205. See id. (limiting the approach to situations where "the plaintiff is seeking to reopen the
arbitration") (emphasis added); see also Ford v. Hamilton Invs., Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 260 (6th Cir.
1994) (applying arbitration award approach but hinting it might apply the remand approach under
different circumstances); Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1472 (1 1th Cir. 1997)
(same).
the same jurisdictional infirmities as the arbitration award approach.2 6
Additionally, measuring the amount in controversy by looking to the
arbitration demand only when remand is requested ignores the fact that the
Federal Arbitration Act grants the district court discretion to "direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators" when "an award is vacated and the time within
which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired ....207
Therefore, the assumption underlying the remand approach that there is a
legal certainty that the amount of the arbitration award is the amount in
controversy when no remand is requested 208 is not necessarily true.
Courts should not ignore fundamental jurisdictional principles in the
name of arbitration. Doing so creates uncertainty. It also sets a dangerous
precedent that issues even tangentially related to arbitration are not
constrained by the rule of law.
C. Addressing Potential Counterarguments
One could argue that adopting the arbitration demand is not
necessitated, or even contemplated, by the time of filing requirement or its
analogous legal certainty test. Analogizing the petition to vacate to a motion
to remand after removal to federal court, wherein the court may look to the
record existing at the time of removal to ascertain if the amount in
controversy has been met, 20 9 one could argue that the time for examining the
amount in controversy is the time the dispute is brought before the federal
court. However, doing so in the context of a petition to vacate an arbitration
award would punish adversaries for bringing actions in arbitration rather
than federal court by potentially depriving them of federal jurisdiction they
would have enjoyed had they originally brought the action in federal court,
where jurisdiction would have been determined at the good faith filing of the
complaint.21 ° Such an approach would, therefore, contravene the arbitral
principle of efficiency by discouraging arbitration altogether,2" and could
206. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
207. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b).
208. See, e.g., Sirotzky, 347 F.3d at 989; see also Ford, 29 F.3d at 260; Baltin, 128 F.3d at 1472.
209. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Olcott, 983 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (D. Kan. 1997) ("A court determines
a defendant's right of removal by examining the record and the status of the pleadings at the time
defendant filed its petition for removal.").
210. See Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 329 (1st Cir. 2000). The court asserted
that:
One approach would be to analogize this to the situation where the claim in a court
complaint exceeds $75,000 but the jury awards less than $75,000. Under these
circumstances, there is diversity jurisdiction.... A contrary result would mean a loss of
diversity jurisdiction that would have otherwise been present if the case had been
litigated rather than arbitrated (or even if a motion to compel arbitration had been
brought).
Id.
211. See Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
"the very purpose of arbitration-the provision of a relatively quick, efficient and informal means of
private dispute settlement... "); see also Sink v. Aden Enters., Inc., 352 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.
2003) ("One purpose of the FAA's liberal approach to arbitration is the efficient and expeditious
resolution of claims.").
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further burden the already-overloaded federal court system. 212 Additionally,
although the arbitration demand approach does not square perfectly with the
legal certainty and time of filing doctrines due to its unique circumstances, it
is a much better fit than to reject all notions of the doctrine by forcing a
determination of the amount in controversy at the time of what is effectively
an appeal. The petition to vacate is not akin to removal, does not follow the
same procedures as removal, and does not result in the same outcome as
removal.
One could also argue that the petition to vacate is not the same as an
appeal. This argument rests on the notion that the privately-selected and
employed arbitrator is not a lower court judge subject to traditional appellate
review. With the continued judicialization of arbitration, and the trend
among many courts to allow parties to contract for expanded review, the
underlying premises of this argument (the private nature of arbitration and
lack of traditional review) are not entirely valid. Furthermore, the issue is
not one of treating arbitration procedures differently, but whether the courts
should treat federal court diversity jurisdiction determinations differently in
this context. The courts should not. To the extent the judiciary is allowing
the federal courts to review arbitration awards, even if under a more
forgiving standard, there is no reasoned basis for treating the determination
of federal court jurisdiction differently in this context than in a traditional
courtroom litigation context.
As arbitration becomes more judicialized, more overlap is going to
occur with traditional principles, and thus more opportunities will present
themselves to follow as closely as possible, or to completely disregard, those
fundamental principles. This author suggests we follow the traditional
notions to the extent possible, lest arbitration become the many-headed
hydra, loosed to wreak havoc on traditional principles.
V. ON FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY - BALANCING FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
PRINCIPLES AND ARBITRATION POLICIES
Ultimately, it may not be enough in many people's eyes to argue that the
arbitration process should follow traditional jurisdictional principles as
closely as possible. One may argue that arbitration is by definition different
212. See, e.g., Conyers, supra note 48, at 497. Conyers asserts that:
The workload problem in the federal courts is currently at an acute stage. The most
recent available statistics, covering 2001, indicate that federal district courts are seeing
377 civil filings per authorized judgeship each year. This figure underestimates the
problem, because it includes all authorized judgeships, ignoring the fact that many remain
unfilled. Chief Justice Rehnquist has criticized Congress and President Clinton for
exacerbating the courts' workload problem with legislation that brought more cases into
the federal system.
Id.
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from federal court lawsuits, and therefore should be treated differently.213
Although this argument contradicts the efforts by courts to maintain
consistency when possible, and the continued judicialization of
arbitration,214 this idea may reflect the perception of some. Even so,
traditional and fundamental principles underlying arbitration should not be
dismissed so quickly. The next logical step, therefore, in determining how
to calculate the amount in controversy in a petition to vacate an arbitration
award, would be to determine which, if any, of the available approaches
support the purposes and policy goals of arbitration.
One of the primary purposes of arbitration is to present an attractive
non-judicial method for resolving disputes that is both fair and efficient.2t 5
If the process is not attractive, it will necessarily wither from lack of use. If
not efficient, it offers little advantage over traditional litigation, and
therefore provides cost with little corresponding benefit. If not fair, it cannot
represent itself as an equitable alternative for providing justice.
Perhaps the most prominently cited purpose underlying arbitration is
efficiency. 16 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that one
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act's liberal policy toward arbitration is
to promote the efficient resolution of claims. 21 7 Ideally, arbitration allows
parties to avoid a forum that is efficient in three ways: less expensive,2t 8 less
time-consuming, 1 9 and more informal220 than traditional litigation.
There is certainly an efficiency argument to be made in favor of the
arbitration award approach. Looking only to the amount of the arbitrator's
award is simple, clean, and refreshingly easy. Nobody needs to look beyond
the documents that are already before the court, namely the award. No one
needs to hash out when the action was filed, how much was truly demanded,
and whether that demand changed over the course of the proceedings.
The efficient nature of arbitration, however, needs to be tempered by the
policy of fundamental fairness, both actual and perceived. 2  If one
213. See generally supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences
between traditional litigation and arbitration.
214. For a discussion of the continuing judicialization of arbitration, see Edward Brunet, supra
note 59.
215. See Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 481 (10th Cir.
1996) (recognizing "the purpose of arbitration, namely, an efficient, inexpensive and fair resolution
of the dispute").
216. See Antwine, 899 F.2d at 412; see also Sink, 352 F.3d at 1201.
217. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974).
218. See Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 481 (recognizing "the purpose of arbitration, namely, an efficient,
inexpensive and fair resolution of the dispute").
219. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Arbitration is
designed primarily to avoid the complex, time-consuming and costly alternative of litigation.").
220. See Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2003)
("The arbitration process is a speedy and informal alternative to litigation, and, by its very nature, is
intended to resolve disputes without confinement to many of the procedural and evidentiary
strictures that protect the integrity of formal trials.").
221. See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 494 n.7 (6th Cir. 2004) ("When the
process used to select the arbitrator is fundamentally unfair, as in this case, the arbitral forum is not
an effective substitute for a judicial forum .. "); Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20
(2d Cir. 1997) ("Courts have interpreted [9 U.S.C.] section 10(a)(3) to mean that except where
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approach for determining the amount in controversy is unfair or perceived as
unfair, adoption of that approach may dissuade parties from choosing
arbitration. Additionally, adoption of an unfair or perceived-unfair approach
makes the determination of jurisdiction as a whole suspect. If the
jurisdictional determination is suspect, then the authority of the court to
make a final determination is dubious. If the authority is dubious, then the
ultimate determination itself may be questionable. Simply put, whether truly
unfair or not, a process that is perceived as unfair is neither attractive, nor
favored.
Evaluating whether any method for determining the amount in
controversy in a petition to vacate an arbitration award adequately balances
fairness and efficiency so as to make for an attractive alternative to the
judiciary raises three questions: (a) Does the method treat the arbitrating
plaintiff equally with the defendant in arbitration?; (b) Does the method treat
arbitrating parties fairly as compared to traditional litigants?; and (c) Is the
process for determining the amount in controversy internally consistent?
Each is discussed in turn.
A. Does the Method Treat the Arbitrating Plaintiff Equally with the
Defendant in Arbitration?
The first fairness factor considers whether the judicial process offers one
litigant the same opportunities as his adversary.222 Arbitration that offers
one party fewer rights than his adversary should not be considered fair. In
fact, arbitration that offers even the perception of an imbalance of rights
between the parties risks being labeled unfair.
The arbitration award approach raises these concerns. Absent the
existence of defense counterclaims, a plaintiff is, by definition, more likely
than the defendant to get an award of more than $75,000. A judgment in
favor of the defense will be zero dollars, not including costs and fees. Under
the arbitration award approach, the inevitable result is that the defendant will
have more of an opportunity for federal court review. A defense verdict for
zero dollars will never support the amount in controversy for diversity
jurisdiction in a plaintiff's petition to vacate, but a plaintiff award of more
than $75,000 will support diversity jurisdiction in a defendant's petition.
fundamental fairness is violated, arbitration determinations will not be opened up to evidentiary
review."); Forsythe, Int'l, N.A. v. Gibb Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) ("In
reviewing the district court's vacatur, we posit the same question addressed by the district court:
whether the arbitration proceedings were fundamentally unfair.").
222. See, e.g., Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. v. Union de Tronquistas
Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 39 (lst Cir. 1985) ("The arbitrator is the judge of the admissibility and
relevancy of evidence submitted in an arbitration proceeding.... The arbitrator is not bound to hear
all of the evidence tendered by the parties; however, he must give each of the parties to the dispute
an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and arguments.").
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The notion that defendants are more likely to obtain federal review of
arbitration awards is, at a base level, troubling, particularly if there is an
equitable way to avoid such a result. Although a defendant's ability to
obtain federal review may not be viewed as fundamentally unfair in the eyes
of the court because the plaintiff can still seek review in a state court, it may
be viewed by the plaintiff as a blatant inequity. Many perceive federal
courts to be more knowledgeable, and less subject to hometown bias. 23 The
perceived inequity that a corporate defendant can seek review of a "better"
court may perpetuate the oft-cited concern that corporate defendants are
using contractual arbitration provisions to their own strategic advantage.
Many consider arbitration provisions in contracts (particularly those
involving consumers) to be susceptible to use as tools of corporate giants
who draft the arbitration provisions to their benefit and thereby force
consumers into "unregulated and unregulable mandatory binding
arbitration .... ,224 Many also subscribe to the notion that the mandatory
arbitration that results from these provisions "appear[] likely to harm the
poorest and least educated members of society. ' '225 Add to this notion the
perception that the corporate defendant can then virtually assure that review
of an award in favor of the plaintiff will occur in a federal court, whereas the
plaintiff seeking review of a defense award will be relegated to (at least
perceived) inferior courts.
If people refuse to agree to arbitration provisions because of this
perceived inequity in access to federal review, then the arbitration award
approach could undermine the policy of promoting non-judicial alternatives
to litigation. 26 If people still arbitrate, or feel they have no choice but to
arbitrate, the perceived inequities that arise during the arbitration may leave
them frustrated and bitter.
In the context of a corollary petition to confirm an arbitration award,
two courts have addressed a similar inequity, but in favor of the plaintiff. In
223. See, e.g., Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases under
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 375 (1992) ("The research also
found that perceived bias against out-of-state litigants is still frequently reported, especially in less
urban areas, and federal judges are perceived to be superior to their state court counterparts."); Burt
Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are more
competent and equipped to hear constitutional challenges).
224. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 19, at 642. Sternlight asserts that:
[W]hile binding arbitration may well be preferable from the standpoint of certain
segments of society- particularly large companies that draft the terms and court
administrators and judges who can reduce their own workload-there is no reason to
believe that society as a whole is better off with binding arbitration. Rather, the Court's
espousal of largely unregulated and unregulable mandatory binding arbitration appears
likely to harm the poorest and least educated members of society.
Id.
225. See id.
226. See, e.g., Towey v. Catling, 743 F. Supp. 738, 741 n.1 (D. Haw. 1990) ("This court ardently
supports the arbitration of certain classes of cases as a means of reducing the ever-increasing costs of
litigation, and concludes that federal policy also supports the promotion of alternative dispute
resolution wherever possible."); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-511
(1974).
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North American Thought Combine, Inc. v. Kelly 227 and Doctor's Associates,
Inc. v. Stuart,228  the Southern District of New York and District of
Connecticut, respectively, recognized that a zero dollar award would never
support diversity jurisdiction on a defendant's petition to confirm, while an
award in favor of the plaintiff in excess of $75,000 would support diversity
jurisdiction.2 2 9 The courts acknowledged that the result would be to prevent
prevailing defendants in arbitration from obtaining confirmation from a
federal court.230 In addressing this concern, the District of Connecticut in
Stuart adopted what is essentially the arbitration demand approach in an
action to confirm the arbitration award: "The amount in controversy is the
difference 'between winning and losing the underlying arbitration.'
231
While the Southern District of New York did not go so far in Kelly as to
wholesale adopt the arbitration demand,232 the court did recognize that,
under the limited circumstances in which the defendant seeks to confirm an
arbitration award, the court should look to the amount at issue in the
underlying arbitration.233
Likewise, the arbitration demand approach in the context of a petition to
vacate remedies any actual or perceived inequity regarding access to federal
review, while respecting traditional notions regarding the amount in
controversy.234 Whether the parties will petition the federal or state court for
227. 249 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
228. 11 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D. Conn. 1998).
229. See id. at 224. In Stuart, the court expressed its concern that
Defendants challenge jurisdiction to confirm the award asserting that '[s]ince the
arbitrator awarded no damages, the requisite amount in dispute in excess of $75,000 is
not in dispute with respect to the application to confirm the arbitration award ....'
Answer to Application to Confirm Arbitration Award ("Answer") 4. Defendants'
position would effectively preclude any defendant who prevailed in an arbitration from
petitioning a district court to confirm the award.
Id.; see also Kelly, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (sharing the Stuart court's concern).
230. See Kelly, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Stuart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
231. Stuart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
232. See Kelly, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 285-86.
233. See id. at 285. The court noted that:
The Court believes that when deciding whether jurisdiction exists in a petition for
confirmation of an arbitration award, the amount in controversy is the value of the award
itself to the petitioner .... If the award itself were the sole determinant, the numeric value
of the arbitrator's award would be zero in a case where a defendant had prevailed in the
arbitration. This is why the true value of the award in such cases should be measured by
the value of the award to the petitioning defendant. This can be achieved by looking to
the underlying complaint because this is the value to the defendant of prevailing in the
arbitration.
Id. Although the Kelly court's general rule of looking to the award in arbitration appears to violate
jurisdictional, fairness, and arbitration principles for the reasons discussed herein with respect to
petitions to vacate, we will save the debate over petitions to confirm for another article. For now,
the court has at least addressed the concern of allowing one party more access to federal review, and
has done so by recognizing the of looking to the underlying arbitration demand.
234. See supra notes 102, 136-37 and accompanying text; see also Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v.
Hutson, 229 F.3d 321, 329 (lst Cir. 2000).
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vacatur of any arbitral award can be determined from the good faith demand
in the arbitration. If the amount sought is less than the jurisdictional
minimum, any vacatur action must be brought in state court. If the amount
sought is more than $75,000, the vacatur petition can be filed with the
federal court. No matter the arbitration award, the parties will stand on
equal footing as to which court may hear the petition.
In the same way, the arbitration demand approach reduces the
guesswork. Rather than parties waiting until the end of the arbitration
proceedings to determine which court is appropriate for the vacatur petition,
adversaries will understand where the petition need be filed from the time of
the plaintiff s filing of his or her demand.
B. Does the Method Treat Arbitrating Parties Fairly as Compared to
Traditional Litigants?
The second fairness factor considers whether the system is treating
arbitrating parties fairly in relation to their traditional-litigation counterparts.
Whether the arbitral parties are treated fairly, or perceive themselves as
being treated fairly, may depend not only on how the parties are treated as
compared to each other, but also how they are treated as compared to
traditional litigants. The mere fact that a traditional litigant may have access
to certain opportunities unavailable to the arbitrating party is not alarming in
and of itself. That is the nature of arbitration.235 Whether the difference is
enough to deter parties from turning to arbitration in the first place is a
whole different issue. Or viewed from an efficiency rather than fairness
analysis, one would query whether the advantages of arbitration outweigh
what one is trading away.
Under the arbitration award approach, what the arbitrating party may be
trading away is, again, federal review. If the arbitration demand is more
than $75,000, yet the award is less, diversity jurisdiction will not exist for a
federal court to hear the petition.236 Under the exact same circumstances in
traditional courtroom litigation - where the plaintiff demands in good faith
more than $75,000, but is awarded less than that amount-the federal court
will hear the appeal. 7 If a party is not willing to make that trade, the policy
goals underlying arbitration are, again, defeated.
From a more fundamental and holistic perspective, there appears to be
no rational basis for the distinction. If the federal court can hear an appeal
of the exact same issue from a traditional litigant, why can the federal court
not hear the same "appeal" of an arbitration award, particularly since the
constricted standard of review simplifies the issues before the court? The
arbitration demand approach makes no such artificial distinction, but rather
harmonizes the scenarios.
235. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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C. Is the Process Internally Consistent?
Balancing fairness and efficiency begs the further question of whether
courts are internally consistent when determining the amount in controversy
with respect to petitions under the FAA, or, whether the courts' reliance on
one approach results in inconsistent jurisdictional determinations, thereby
creating inefficiencies and the perception of unfairness.
Looking to the way courts handle the amount in controversy in petitions
to compel arbitration suggests that the arbitration award approach creates
these inconsistencies. The petition to vacate is not the only petition
available to arbitrating parties under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Act
also provides that, when a contracting party fails to honor an agreement to
arbitrate that is covered by the Act, the other contracting party may
petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action
or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the
controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. 23
8
In examining diversity jurisdiction in a petition to compel arbitration, courts
generally agree that the amount in controversy is the amount at stake (or put
another way, the amount that could be awarded) in the underlying
arbitration.2 39
Given that courts look to what is in essence the arbitration demand
approach in determining the amount in controversy in a petition to compel
arbitration, 240 if a court looks to the arbitration award approach in a petition
238. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
239. See, e.g., We Care Hair Dev., Inc. v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838, 841 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[S]ince the
present suit is not a removal suit but rather an independent federal suit, it is the stakes of the
arbitration and not the possible state court award that control, and an arbitrator could award more
than the amount sought in the state court complaint."); Webb v. Investacorp., 89 F.3d 252, 256 (5th
Cir. 1996) ("We are persuaded that Davenport [241 F.2d 511, 514 (2d Cir. 1957)] and its progeny
state the correct rule in holding that the amount in controversy in a motion to compel arbitration is
the amount of the potential award in the underlying arbitration proceeding."); Jumara v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Thus the amount in controversy in a petition to compel
arbitration or appoint an arbitrator is determined by the underlying cause of action that would be
arbitrated."); Davenport v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Corp., 241 F.2d 511, 514 (2d Cir. 1957) ("In
considering the jurisdictional amount requirement the court should look through to the possible
award resulting from the desired arbitration, since the petition to compel arbitration is only the initial
step in a litigation which seeks as its goal a judgment affirming the award."); see also America's
Moneyline, Inc. v. Coleman, 360 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2004) ("In the context of actions to compel
arbitration, we have adhered to the rule that, in order to ascertain whether the jurisdictional amount
for the diversity statute has been met, the appropriate focus is the stakes of the underlying arbitration
dispute.").
240. Courts likely phrase this test slightly differently from the arbitration demand approach
because a demand for relief in arbitration is often not made by the time the petition to compel
arbitration is ruled on. Cf Jumara, 55 F.3d at 877 ("Thus the amount in controversy in a petition to
to vacate, it is applying two diametrically opposing jurisdictional tests to the
same case, albeit at different stages of the litigation. Proponents of the
arbitration award approach may argue that this is acceptable, and that
petitions to compel and petitions to vacate are as different as apples and
oranges. The petition to compel is typically filed near the beginning of the
case, when the total amount in dispute is still what the plaintiff can expect to
recover. The petition to vacate is filed after an arbitrator makes an award,
and challenges only the award; therefore, the amount at issue between the
parties is the award and nothing else.
Not only is this view contrary to the traditional time of filing and legal
certainty doctrines, as discussed above,24' but it may result in significant
inefficiencies. The fact that the petition to compel may be heard by the
federal court, but the petition to vacate in the same case may not, could
result in the same case being heard by three separate jurisdictions: the
federal court, then the arbitrator, and then the state court.
Consider the following hypothetical. Corporation X sues corporation Y
in federal court for $150,000. Corporation Y petitions the federal court to
refer the matter to arbitration, based on the earlier agreement of the parties.
The federal court grants the petition. The arbitrator then hears the matter
and awards Corporation X $60,000. Corporation Y then petitions the federal
court to vacate the arbitration award. Under the arbitration award approach,
the federal court would not have jurisdiction to hear the petition - despite the
fact that it heard the earlier petition to compel arbitration in the exact same
case - because the arbitrator's award is below the jurisdictional minimum.
Corporation Y has no choice but to petition the state court for relief,
meaning that a third "court" exercises jurisdiction over the same case. The
inefficiencies in such an approach are apparent.
Under the arbitration demand approach, however, whether the federal
court has diversity jurisdiction to hear the petition to vacate is based on the
same standard as whether it has jurisdiction to hear the petition to compel.
The amount in controversy is determined in both cases based on the amount
of the original demand. By harmonizing the two jurisdictional
determinations, the arbitration demand approach reduces the inefficiencies,
thereby promoting the policy goals of arbitration.242 Harmonizing the two
determinations also bolsters the trust in the judicial system in the eyes of
compel arbitration or appoint an arbitrator is determined by the underlying cause of action that
would be arbitrated."). Where a demand has been made, courts have looked to that amount as the
measure of the test of the amount at stake in the arbitration. See, e.g., Webb, 89 F.3d at 256-57. The
court held that:
We are persuaded that Davenport and its progeny state the correct rule in holding that the
amount in controversy in a motion to compel arbitration is the amount of the potential
award in the underlying arbitration proceeding.... Therefore, the district court properly
looked to the amount of Investacorp's claim in the underlying arbitration to determine the
amount in controversy in this action for declaratory relief.
Id.
241. See supra Part IV-C.
242. See supra notes 216-22 and accompanying text for further discussion of the policy goals of
arbitration.
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parties and laypeople who do not understand the legal fictions that lawyers
and courts often create.
VI. CONCLUSION
Paul Simon may be correct. There may be fifty ways to leave your
lover. And in an arena so sensitive as the termination of a romantic, perhaps
forbidden, relationship, one may need a variety of options for ceasing the
involvement. Not so with the amount in controversy in a petition to vacate
an arbitration award. The arbitration demand approach is enough. It is the
only one of the three current approaches that remains true to traditional
notions of jurisdiction by determining the amount in controversy at the
initiation of the controversy, not at the point of what is essentially an appeal.
The arbitration demand approach also best balances efficiency and fairness.
This approach treats the arbitrating parties fairly as compared to each other
and traditional litigants, and ensures that amount in controversy
determinations in hearings on FAA petitions are consistently applied.
Protecting traditional jurisdictional and arbitration principles should be the
goal, not merely an option.
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